This Chapter shall be known and may be cited as the North Carolina Securities Act.
(1925, c. 190, s. 1; 1927, c. 149, s. 1; 1943, c. 104, s. 1; 1973, c. 1380.)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1973, c. 1380 repealed former Chapter 78 , Securities Law, and enacted present Chapter 78A in its place. Where appropriate, the historical citations to the sections of repealed Chapter 78 have been added to similar sections in new Chapter 78A . Many of the cases cited under the sections of Chapter 78A were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 78.
Legal Periodicals. - For article on blue sky laws, see 1 N.C.L.Rev. 27 (1923).
For article discussing the history of blue sky laws, summarizing the various statutes, and discussing the North Carolina cases, see 3 N.C.L. Rev. 150 (1925).
For comment on limited offerings, the federal securities code and increased burdens on the North Carolina Securities Act, see 15 Wake Forest L. Rev. 506 (1979).
For article, "A Model for Determining the Excessive Trading Element in Churning Claims," see 68 N.C.L. Rev. 327 (1990).
For comment, "Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and Thinly-Traded Securities Under Rule 10b-5: How Does a Court Decide If a Stock Market Is Efficient?," see 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 223 (1990).
For comment, "Access to Capital: Rethinking Local Crowdfunding," see 38 Campbell L. Rev. 365 (2016).
For article, "Equity Crowdfunding as Economic Development?," see 38 Campbell L. Rev. 317 (2016).
For article, "Strict in the Wrong Places: State Crowdfunding Exemptions' Failure to Effectively Balance Investor Protection and Capital Raising," see 38 Campbell L. Rev. 267 (2016).
For note, "Rethinking Janus: Preserving Primary Participant Liability in SEC Antifraud Enforcement Actions," see 65 Duke L.J. 527 (2016).
For article, "The Tax Implications of Crowdfunding: From Income to Deductions," see 97 N.C.L. Rev. 710 (2019).
Editor's Note. - Many of the cases cited below were decided under former Chapter 78 .
Constitutionality. - It is within the police power of the State to pass a statute for the protection of its citizens against the sale to them of worthless shares of stock in speculative companies in the exercise of a power in the State reserved from that grant to the federal government, and such a statute does not contravene either the State or federal Constitution. State ex rel. Smith v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 191 N.C. 643 , 132 S.E. 792 (1926), error dismissed, 275 U.S. 505, 48 S. Ct. 156, 72 L. Ed. 396 (1927).
Chapter Is Within Police Power. - The regulation of the sale of securities for the protection of the public is within the police power of the State. State v. Allen, 216 N.C. 621 , 5 S.E.2d 844 (1939).
Application of Chapter. - This Chapter applies where money is invested in stock, securities, profit-sharing agreements, etc., with the purpose of securing an income from the employment of the money, and a contract whereby the owner of a copyright system gives the exclusive right to another to operate the system in certain counties, and in return is to receive a percentage of the gross receipts from the operation of the system, with further provision for a division of net profit from sales or contracts written by either party, does not contemplate the placing of money in a way to secure an income from its employment, but the earning of a portion of the gross receipts in return for individual services, and the agreement is not a profit-sharing scheme or investment contract within the intent and meaning of the statute. State v. Heath, 199 N.C. 135 , 153 S.E. 855 (1930).
The purpose of "Blue Sky Laws" is to protect the general public from "wildcat" organizers, promoters and their agents, whether foreign or domestic, preying upon an unsuspecting and confiding public by selling "blue sky stock," without obtaining license and giving bond. State ex rel. Smith v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 191 N.C. 643 , 132 S.E. 792 (1926), error dismissed, 275 U.S. 505, 48 S. Ct. 156, 72 L. Ed. 396 (1927).
Cited in Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985); Mastrom, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 78 N.C. App. 483, 337 S.E.2d 162 (1985); Ward v. Zabady, 85 N.C. App. 130, 354 S.E.2d 369 (1987); Heath v. Craighill, Rendleman, Ingle & Blythe, 97 N.C. App. 236, 388 S.E.2d 178 (1990); State v. Clemmons, 111 N.C. App. 569, 433 S.E.2d 748 (1993); Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1994).
Opinions of Attorney General
No Precedence over Administrative Procedure Act. - The provisions of this Chapter are not stated with the specificity and particularity sufficient to take precedence over any similar provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, G.S. 150B-1 et seq., which might conceivably apply to the actions and proceedings addressed by the Securities Act. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).
Contested Cases. - Determinations made by the securities administrator pursuant to his statutory authority are considered "contested cases" within the meaning of G.S. 150B-2(2) . Such determinations control or restrict the activities of dealers, salesmen, or issuers of securities, but these determinations only become "contested cases" if the administrator's action is "disputed" by the subject of such determination. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).
When used in this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1925, c. 190, s. 2; 1927, c. 149, s. 2; 1933, c. 432; 1943, c. 104, ss. 2, 3; 1955, c. 436, s. 1; 1973, c. 1380; 1983, c. 817, ss. 1-3; 1987, c. 849, s. 1; 1989, c. 12, s. 1; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 600, s. 3; 1995, c. 509, s. 35; 1997-419, ss. 1-4; 2001-201, ss. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; 2001-436, s. 6; 2011-284, s. 61.)
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-284, s. 61, effective June 24, 2011, in the introductory paragraph of subdivision (13) and in subdivision (13)a., substituted "or devise" for "devise, or bequest."
Meaning of "Sale" - See Lane v. Griswold, 273 N.C. 1 , 159 S.E.2d 338 (1968).
The definition of "sale" under paragraph (8)a of this section does not include the mere signing of a stock certificate by a corporate officer. State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 746 (1990).
The legislature has shown no intent to include both principal and agent transactions within the word "sale." Lane v. Griswold, 273 N.C. 1 , 159 S.E.2d 338 (1968).
Sale Not Shown. - Actions of defendant, an attorney who drafted articles of incorporation and served as an original director and officer of corporation, did not constitute a "sale" and defendant was not a "seller," where there was neither evidence at trial that he was the owner of the security, nor that he was the one who successfully solicited the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner. State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 746, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 144 , 394 S.E.2d 184 (1990).
Cattle feeding program involving the buying, financings, caring for and sale of cattle for investors, which was open to any interested investors and advertised in national publications, was an investment contract which was not entitled to a private placement exemption and hence a security within the meaning of the applicable federal and state securities laws. Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1987).
Value of Property Does Not Affect Definition as a Security. - In a prosecution for violation of the Capital Issues Law the fact that the property sold is of little value is irrelevant to the question of whether the property is a security as defined by the statute. State v. Allen, 216 N.C. 621 , 5 S.E.2d 844 (1939).
No Transaction Involving a "Security" Shown. - Where defendant falsely told the victims that he would invest their money in stock options and subsequently falsely told the victims that he had invested their money in stock options when, in fact, defendant never actually purchased or sold a "security" as defined by subdivision (11), the State failed to present evidence linking defendant's offer to invest money for the victims to any participation of defendant in an actual transaction involving a "security" and defendant's misconduct (offering to transact business) did not fall within the scope of G.S. 78A-36 . State v. Clemmons, 111 N.C. App. 569, 433 S.E.2d 748 (1993).
Two managers of a limited liability company were not primarily liable for securities fraud under G.S. 78A-56(a)(2) because nothing showed the managers sold or offered securities, as defined in G.S. 78A-2(8)(b) . Atkinson v. Lackey, - N.C. - , - S.E.2d - (Feb. 27, 2015).
Cited in Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1994); Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016).
§§ 78A-3 through 78A-7: Reserved for future codification purposes.
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly:
Legal Periodicals. - For note, "Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co.: North Carolina's Caveat Tipper Exception to the In Pari Delicto Doctrine," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1250 (1986).
For article, "The Anti-Fraud Provisions of the North Carolina Securities Act," see 35 Campbell L. Rev. 209 (2013).
Federal Law Paralleled. - The North Carolina securities anti-fraud provision closely parallels SEC Rule 10b-5. Among the fundamental purposes underlying § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) and SEC Rule 10b-5 are to promote free and open public securities markets, to protect the investing public from inequities in trading, and to insure that the investing public should be subject to identical market risks and allowed equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions. These securities laws seek to protect the innocent public who is not privy to selectively disclosed tips. Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 70 N.C. App. 517, 320 S.E.2d 424, modified on other grounds, 314 N.C. 267 , 333 S.E.2d 236 (1985).
This section closely parallels the S.E.C. Rule 10(b)-5 antifraud provision, which is designed to ensure that investors are aware of market risks. State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 746 (1990).
The scope of this section applies only to those persons who sell or offer to sell a security. State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 746, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 144 , 394 S.E.2d 184 (1990).
"Purchase". - Although "purchase" is not defined in this Chapter, it is generally defined as obtaining merchandise by paying money or its equivalent. State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 746, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 144 , 394 S.E.2d 184 (1990).
Stock Options Are Securities. - The term "security" includes the offer, sale, or purchase of stock options. State v. Davidson, 131 N.C. App. 276, 506 S.E.2d 743 (1998).
Applicability of Subdivision (2). - Subdivision (2) of this section applies only when the alleged material statements are made or omitted in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security. State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 746, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 144 , 394 S.E.2d 184 (1990).
"Tipper" and "Tippee" Defined. - Federal law has defined a "tipper" as a person who has possession of material inside information and who makes selective disclosure of such information for trading or other personal purposes. A "tippee" is one who receives such information from a "tipper." Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 70 N.C. App. 517, 320 S.E.2d 424, modified on other grounds, 314 N.C. 267 , 333 S.E.2d 236 (1985).
Use of Securities Laws to Stop Both Tippers and Tippees. - Although heretofore securities laws promulgated to protect against the disclosure of "inside information" have primarily been used to stop tippers, so as to most effectively insure that the innocent investing public is protected, the unscrupulous tippee as well as the tipper must be deterred. Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 70 N.C. App. 517, 320 S.E.2d 424, modified on other grounds, 314 N.C. 267 , 333 S.E.2d 236 (1985).
The concept of selective disclosure of inside information assumes the fact that the tipper will tell a tippee who will act on the information and unfairly profit by it at the public's expense. The investing public will more readily be protected if those tippees are discouraged from acting on any inside information illegally disclosed. It is also more probable that inside trading will stop if tippers realize the senselessness of risking criminal prosecution for disclosing inside information to a tippee who will not use the information. Moreover, there should be no opportunity in the scheme of securities laws' enforcement for the tippee to weigh the reliability and the value of the tip against the amount he may be able to recover in a lawsuit against the tipper for his disclosure of false inside information, especially when that tippee could conceivably recover treble damages under the Unfair Trade Practice Act. Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 70 N.C. App. 517, 320 S.E.2d 424, modified on other grounds, 314 N.C. 267 , 333 S.E.2d 236 (1985).
Investor's Involvement in Constructing Offer Made to Him Did Not Bar Recovery. - Fact that investor in limited partnership was somehow involved in the construction of the terms of the offer made to him did not bar recovery in suit for recession of securities, violation of registration requirements and fraud. Walker v. Montclaire Hous. Partners, 736 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
Cattle feeding program involving the buying, financings, caring for and sale of cattle for investors, which was open to any interested investors and advertised in national publications, was an investment contract which was not entitled to a private placement exemption and hence a security within the meaning of the applicable federal and state securities laws. Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1987).
To determine if an omitted fact is material under this section, evidence must be presented that there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable purchaser would consider it important in deciding whether or not to purchase. State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 746, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 144 , 394 S.E.2d 184 (1990).
Claims Not Barred by Statute of Limitations. - Investors' claims under the North Carolina Securities Act, G.S. 78A-1 to G.S. 78A-66 , were not barred by the Act's statute of limitations, G.S. 78A-56(f) , because the investors not only asserted claims under G.S. 78A-24 and G.S. 78A-36 , but also brought a claim for securities fraud under G.S. 78A-8 and G.S. 78A-56 , which were subject to the three-year limitations period, G.S. 78A-56(f) ; the jury's finding that the agent violated G.S. 78A-8 and G.S. 78A-56 , which were subject to the three-year statute of limitations, supported its verdict. Latta v. Rainey, 202 N.C. App. 587, 689 S.E.2d 898 (2010).
Motion to Dismiss Denied. - Motion to dismiss was denied because plaintiffs plausibly alleged that defendants violated 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (Rule 10b-5) and G.S. 78A-8 by representing to the trustee that the annuities would have guaranteed annual returns of five percent. Thorpe v. Ameritas Inv. Corp., - F. Supp. 2d - (E.D.N.C. Sept. 19, 2012).
Evidence Sufficient for Conviction. - The evidence supported defendant's conviction for making material misrepresentations and omissions in connection with the sale of securities, where the defendant convinced elderly investors to withdraw funds from a legitimate investment company and placed the funds in his own accounts and used them for risky investments. State v. Davidson, 131 N.C. App. 276, 506 S.E.2d 743 (1998).
Cited in Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker, 38 N.C. App. 414, 248 S.E.2d 567 (1978); Weft, Inc. v. G.C. Inv. Assocs., 630 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D.N.C. 1986); Simms Inv. Co. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 688 F. Supp. 193 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 94 (M.D.N.C. 1993); Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1994); Jay Group, Ltd. v. Glasgow, 139 N.C. App. 595, 534 S.E.2d 233 (2000), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 265 , 546 S.E.2d 100 (2000); Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016).
It is unlawful for any person to make or cause to be made, in any document filed with the Administrator or in any proceeding under this Chapter, any statement which is, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made false or misleading in any material respect.
It is unlawful for any person to willfully manage, supervise, control, or own, directly or indirectly, either alone or in association with others, any telephone room in this State. For purposes of this section, "telephone room" means an enterprise in which two or more persons engage in telephone communications with members of the public using two or more telephones at one location, or more than one location in a common scheme or enterprise, in violation of G.S. 78A-8 or G.S. 78A-12 . It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that the person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce an act or acts constituting a violation of G.S. 78A-8 or G.S. 78A-12 .
(1991, c. 456, s. 1; 2003-413, s. 1.)
Cited in Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016).
Cited in Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016).
§ 78A-15: Reserved for future codification purposes.
The following securities are exempted from G.S. 78A-24 and 78A-49(d):
(1925, c. 190, s. 3; 1927, c. 149, s. 3; 1931, c. 243, s. 5; 1955, c. 436, s. 2; 1967, c. 1233, s. 1; 1973, c. 1380; 1981, c. 624, s. 1; 1983, c. 817, ss. 4, 5; 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990) c. 803, s. 1; 2001-149, s. 1; 2001-201, s. 7.)
Questions of Fact. - The questions of whether debentures of a finance company sold to individuals in this State in a given case are exempted securities and of whether such sales were transactions exempted from the operation and of whether the debentures sold to individuals in this State in a given case were of a class that should have been registered before being offered for sale or sold within this State are questions of fact. State v. Franks, 262 N.C. 94 , 136 S.E.2d 623 (1964).
Questions of Law. - The questions of what securities are exempted securities and of what transactions are exempted from the operation of the Securities Law, and of what securities cannot be offered for sale or sold unless registered are questions of law. State v. Franks, 262 N.C. 94 , 136 S.E.2d 623 (1964).
Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the following transactions are exempted from G.S. 78A-24 and G.S. 78A-49(d) :
The Administrator may establish a fee to recover costs for any filing required by such rules, not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00).
(1925, c. 190, s. 4; 1927, c. 149, s. 4; 1935, cc. 90, 154; 1955, c. 436, s. 3; 1959, c. 1185; 1967, c. 1233, ss. 2, 3; 1971, c. 572, s. 1; 1973, c. 1380; 1977, c. 162; c. 610, s. 1; 1979, c. 647, s. 1; 1981, c. 624, s. 2; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1263, ss. 1, 2; 1983, c. 509, ss. 1, 2; c. 817, ss. 6, 7; 1997-419, s. 5; 2001-197, s. 1; 2001-201, ss. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; 2001-436, s. 8; 2002-126, ss. 29A.22, 29A.23; 2004-203, s. 6; 2016-103, s. 1.)
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2004-203, s. 6, effective August 17, 2004, inserted "G.S." preceding "78A-49(d)" in the introductory paragraph; and made minor punctuation changes throughout the section.
Session Laws 2016-103, s. 1, effective July 22, 2016, added subdivision (20).
Legal Periodicals. - For comment on limited offerings, the federal securities code and increased burdens on the North Carolina Securities Act, see 15 Wake Forest L. Rev. 506 (1979).
Questions of Fact. - The questions of whether debentures of a finance company sold to individuals in this State in a given case are exempted securities, and of whether such sales were transactions exempted from the operation, and of whether the debentures sold to individuals in this State in a given case were of a class that should have been registered before being offered for sale or sold within this State are questions of fact. State v. Franks, 262 N.C. 94 , 136 S.E.2d 623 (1964).
Questions of Law. - The questions of what securities are exempted securities and of what transactions are exempted from the operation of the Securities Law and of what securities cannot be offered for sale or sold unless registered are questions of law. State v. Franks, 262 N.C. 94 , 136 S.E.2d 623 (1964).
Integration Doctrine Applicable to Sale of Securities. - The integration doctrine, a method used to combine two or more otherwise exempt securities sales into a single offering, was applicable to a sale of securities where initial purchaser was offered securities through a special arrangement with his broker and was classified as the sole preliminary limited partner, and where the other North Carolina purchasers were 1985 limited partners admitted pursuant to an offering about a month later. Walker v. Montclaire Hous. Partners, 736 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
Initial Offering Violated G.S. 78A-24 Registration Requirements and Precluded Subdivision (9) Protection. - Where it was clear that offering of securities initially to one purchaser and to five other purchasers a month later was part of a single financing plan since the second offering was contemplated at the time of the initial offering and it was apparent that the offering memorandum would not be published until sellers were sure initial offering was purchased and the consideration for all the offerings was the same, the initial offering violated the registration requirements of G.S. 78A-24 and such violation precluded protection under subdivision (9) and subjected the sellers to the civil liabilities provision of G.S. 78A-56(a)(1) , even though the proceeds of the initial offering were for use as seed money while the proceeds of the second offering were for use as general operating expenses, and the profit and losses between the two types of offerings were allocated differently and each had different tax deduction consequences. Walker v. Montclaire Hous. Partners, 736 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
Cattle feeding program involving the buying, financings, caring for and sale of cattle for investors, which was open to any interested investors and advertised in national publications, was an investment contract which was not entitled to a private placement exemption and hence a security within the meaning of the applicable federal and state securities laws. Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1987).
Investments Not Exempt From Registration Requirements. - Because a sales agent's testimony at trial raised a triable issue of fact concerning the number of investors in a corporation's mobile billboard advertising in North Carolina, the trial court properly submitted the issue to the jury to determine whether the agent met his burden of proof under the North Carolina Securities Act, G.S. 78A-18(b) ; the corporation, through its sales agents, was the actual "offeror" of the securities at issue, and the agent failed to cite any authority for his position that the registration exemption in the Act, G.S. 78A-17(9) , applied to the investments because he sold them to only "11 or 12" people in North Carolina. Latta v. Rainey, 202 N.C. App. 587, 689 S.E.2d 898 (2010).
"IN MAKING AN INVESTMENT DECISION, INVESTORS MUST RELY ON THEIR OWN EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUER AND THE TERMS OF THE OFFERING, INCLUDING THE MERITS AND RISKS INVOLVED. THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN RECOMMENDED BY ANY FEDERAL OR STATE SECURITIES COMMISSION OR REGULATORY AUTHORITY. FURTHERMORE, THE FOREGOING AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT CONFIRMED THE ACCURACY OR DETERMINED THE ADEQUACY OF THIS DOCUMENT. ANY REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. THESE SECURITIES ARE SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERABILITY AND RESALE AND MAY NOT BE TRANSFERRED OR RESOLD EXCEPT AS PERMITTED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED, AND THE APPLICABLE STATE SECURITIES LAWS, PURSUANT TO REGISTRATION OR EXEMPTION THEREFROM. INVESTORS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THEY WILL BE REQUIRED TO BEAR THE FINANCIAL RISKS OF THIS INVESTMENT FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME."
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2016-103, s. 4(a) and (b), provides: "4.(a) Notwithstanding any provision of Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes, within 12 months of the effective date of this act [Session Laws 2016-103 was effective July 22, 2016], the Secretary of State shall adopt rules to implement the provisions of this act in accordance with the following procedure:
"(1) At least 15 business days prior to adopting a rule, submit the rule and a notice of public hearing to the Codifier of Rules. The Codifier of Rules shall publish the proposed rule and the notice of public hearing on the Internet within five business days.
"(2) At least 15 business days prior to adopting a rule, notify persons on the mailing list maintained pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.2(d) and any other interested parties of the Secretary's intent to adopt a rule and of the public hearing.
"(3) Accept written comments on the proposed rule for at least 15 business days prior to adoption of the rule.
"(4) Hold at least one public hearing on the proposed rule no less than five days after the rule and notice have been published.
"A rule adopted in accordance with this section becomes effective on the first day of the month following the month the Secretary adopts the rule and submits the rule to the Codifier of Rules for entry into the North Carolina Administrative Code.
"(b) Any rule adopted more than 12 months after the effective date of this act [Session Laws 2016-103 was effective July 22, 2016] shall comply with the requirements of Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes."
Session Laws 2016-103, s. 10, made this section effective July 22, 2016.
(1925, c. 190, ss. 5, 11; 1927, c. 149, ss. 5, 11; 1973, c. 1380; 1975, c. 19, s. 20; 1987, c. 849, s. 2; 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 803, s. 2; 2001-126, s. 1; 2001-149, s. 2.)
Legal Periodicals. - For comment on limited offerings, the federal securities code and increased burdens on the North Carolina Securities Act, see 15 Wake Forest L. Rev. 506 (1979).
Investments Not Exempt From Registration Requirements. - Because a sales agent's testimony at trial raised a triable issue of fact concerning the number of investors in a corporation's mobile billboard advertising in North Carolina, the trial court properly submitted the issue to the jury to determine whether the agent met his burden of proof under the North Carolina Securities Act, G.S. 78A-18(b) ; the corporation, through its sales agents, was the actual "offeror" of the securities at issue, and the agent failed to cite any authority for his position that the registration exemption in the Act, G.S. 78A-17(9) , applied to the investments because he sold them to only "11 or 12" people in North Carolina. Latta v. Rainey, 202 N.C. App. 587, 689 S.E.2d 898 (2010).
§§ 78A-19 through 78A-23: Reserved for future codification purposes.
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this State unless (i) it is registered under this Chapter, (ii) the security or transaction is exempted under G.S. 78A-16 or 78A-17 and such exemption has not been denied or revoked under G.S. 78A-18 , or (iii) it is a security covered under federal law.
(1925, c. 190, s. 6; 1927, c. 149, s. 6; 1955, c. 436, s. 4; 1973, c. 1380; 1997-419, ss. 6, 7.)
"Sale". - The definition of "sale" under G.S. 78A-2(8) a does not include the mere signing of a stock certificate by a corporate officer. State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 746 (1990).
Integration Doctrine Was Applicable to Sale of Securities. - The integration doctrine, a method used to combine two or more otherwise exempt securities sales into a single offering, was applicable to a sale of securities where initial purchaser was offered securities through a special arrangement with his broker and was classified as the sole preliminary limited partner, and where the other North Carolina purchasers were 1985 limited partners admitted pursuant to an offering about a month later. Walker v. Montclaire Hous. Partners, 736 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
Sale Not Shown. - Actions of defendant, an attorney who drafted articles of incorporation and served as an original director and officer of corporation, did not constitute a "sale" and defendant was not a "seller," where there was neither evidence at trial that he was the owner of the security, nor that he was the one who successfully solicited the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner. State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 746, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 144 , 394 S.E.2d 184 (1990).
Invalidation of Indemnity Agreement Between Broker and Issuer. - If a jury should find that an issuer of securities knowingly participated in the illegal sales of securities by a broker, public policy would prohibit enforcement of the indemnity agreement between the broker and the issuer. Premier Corp. v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 578 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1978).
Questions of Fact. - The questions of whether debentures of a finance company sold to individuals in this State in a given case are exempted securities and of whether such sales were transactions exempted from the operation and of whether the debentures sold to individuals in this State in a given case were of a class that should have been registered before being offered for sale or sold within this State are questions of fact. State v. Franks, 262 N.C. 94 , 136 S.E.2d 623 (1964).
Questions of Law. - The questions of what securities are exempted securities and of what transactions are exempted from the operation of the Securities Law and of what securities cannot be offered for sale or sold unless registered are questions of law. State v. Franks, 262 N.C. 94 , 136 S.E.2d 623 (1964).
Claims Not Barred by Statute of Limitations. - Investors' claims under the North Carolina Securities Act, G.S. 78A-1 to G.S. 78A-66 , were not barred by the Act's statute of limitations, G.S. 78A-56(f) , because the investors not only asserted claims under G.S. 78A-24 and G.S. 78A-36 , but also brought a claim for securities fraud under G.S. 78A-8 and G.S. 78A-56 , which were subject to the three-year limitations period, G.S. 78A-56(f) ; the jury's finding that the agent violated G.S. 78A-8 and G.S. 78A-56 , which were subject to the three-year statute of limitations, supported its verdict. Latta v. Rainey, 202 N.C. App. 587, 689 S.E.2d 898 (2010).
Initial Securities Offering Violated This Section. - Where it was clear that offering of securities initially to one purchaser and to five other purchasers a month later were part of a single financing plan since the second offering was contemplated at the time of the initial offering and it was apparent that the offering memorandum would not be published until sellers were sure initial offering was purchased and the consideration for all the offerings was the same, the initial offering violated the registration requirements of this section and such violation precluded protection under G.S. 78A-17(9) and subjected the sellers to the civil liabilities provision of G.S. 78A-56(a)(1) , even though the proceeds of the initial offering were for use as seed money while the proceeds of the second offering were for use as general operating expenses, and the profit and losses between the two types of offerings were allocated differently and each had different tax deduction consequences. Walker v. Montclaire Hous. Partners, 736 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
Cited in Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.C. 1986); Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016).
(1927, c. 149, s. 8; 1955, c. 436, s. 6; 1973, c. 1380; 1975, c. 144, s. 1; 2001-201, s. 13; 2003-413, s. 2.)
(1925, c. 190, s. 6; 1927, c. 149, s. 6; 1955, c. 436, s. 4; 1973, c. 1380; 1981, c. 624, s. 6.)
(1927, c. 149, s. 9; 1955, c. 436, s. 7; 1973, c. 1380; 1975, c. 19, s. 21; 2001-436, s. 9.)
Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Cracking the Problem of Finders - An Empirical and Computational Analysis," see 51 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1021 (2016).
(1973, c. 1380; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1148, s. 1; 1981, c. 452; c. 624, s. 3; c. 682, s. 14; 1983, c. 713, ss. 45-47; 1998-212, s. 29A.9(b).)
Cited in Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016).
The Administrator may not institute a stop-order proceeding against an effective registration statement on the basis of a fact or transaction known to him when the registration statement became effective unless the proceeding is instituted within the next 30 days.
(1973, c. 1380; 2001-126, s. 2.)
Opinions of Attorney General
The statutory standards embodied in this section, G.S. 78A-39(a) and G.S. 78C-28(b) are the public health, safety or welfare criteria which must be considered prior to and upon which a summary suspension must be founded. G.S. 78A-39(c) requires the summary suspension order to include the reasons for its entry. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).
Requirements of G.S. 150B-3(c) Do Not Conflict with This Section. - The requirements in G.S. 150B-3(c) that an agency make a finding that the "public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action" prior to a summary suspension of a license or an occupational license, and that the agency incorporate such finding in its order of suspension, are not in any way in conflict with the findings required to be made by the securities administrator by G.S. 78A-39(a) prior to denying, suspending, or revoking the registration of a securities dealer or salesman and by this section prior to denying, suspending, or revoking the effectiveness of a securities registration statement. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).
(1979, c. 647, ss. 2, 3; 1987, c. 849, s. 8; 1997-419, s. 8; 1998-212, s. 29A.9(c); 2001-201, s. 14.)
(1997-419, s. 9; 1998-212, s. 29A.9(d); 2002-126, ss. 29A.24, 29A.37; 2002-189, s. 4; 2003-284, s. 35B.2(a); 2008-107, s. 29.3(a); 2011-145, s. 31.27A(a).)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2003-284, s. 48.1, provides: "Parts 32 through 47 of this act do not affect the rights or liabilities of the State, a taxpayer, or another person arising under a statute amended or repealed by those parts before the effective date of its amendment or repeal; nor do they affect the right to any refund or credit of a tax that accrued under the amended or repealed statute before the effective date of its amendment or repeal."
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2008-107, s. 29.3(a), effective July 20, 2008, substituted "two thousand dollars ($2,000)" for "two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00)" in subdivision (a)(4).
Session Laws 2011-145, s. 31.27A(a), effective July 1, 2011, and applicable to fees for filings due on or after that date, in the introductory paragraph of subsection (a), inserted "(i) issued by an investment company that is registered or has filed a registration statement under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and (ii)"; and in subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(4), substituted the language "filing fee equal to the sum of one thousand seven hundred twenty-five dollars ($1,725)" through to the end for "filing fee of two thousand dollars ($2,000)."
§§ 78A-32 through 78A-35: Reserved for future codification purposes.
The Administrator may by rule or order require the return of a salesman's license upon the termination of those activities which make him a salesman or, if such return is impossible, require a bond or evidence satisfactory to the Administrator of such impossibility. No salesman may be registered with more than one dealer.
(1925, c. 190, s. 19; 1927, c. 149, s. 19; 1955, c. 436, s. 9; 1959, c. 1122; 1971, c. 831, s. 1; 1973, c. 1380; 1975, c. 144, s. 2; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1148, s. 2; 1981, c. 624, s. 4; 1983, c. 817, s. 8; 2001-182, s. 1.)
Where defendant did not "sell" unregistered security in question, he was not a "salesman" (or a dealer), and therefore was not subject to the requirements of this section. State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 746, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 144 , 394 S.E.2d 184 (1990).
Claims Not Barred by Statute of Limitations. - Investors' claims under the North Carolina Securities Act, G.S. 78A-1 to G.S. 78A-66 , were not barred by the Act's statute of limitations, G.S. 78A-56(f) , because the investors not only asserted claims under G.S. 78A-24 and G.S. 78A-36 , but also brought a claim for securities fraud under G.S. 78A-8 and G.S. 78A-56 , which were subject to the three-year limitations period, G.S. 78A-56(f) ; the jury's finding that the agent violated G.S. 78A-8 and G.S. 78A-56 , which were subject to the three-year statute of limitations, supported its verdict. Latta v. Rainey, 202 N.C. App. 587, 689 S.E.2d 898 (2010).
Cited in Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016).
Opinions of Attorney General
Registration with Secretary of State. - This section makes it unlawful to engage in the business of affecting transactions in securities without being registered with the Secretary of State. That registration is encompassed by the definition of "occupational license" at G.S. 150B-2 (4a) in that registration confers the right or privilege to engage in a field of endeavor regulated by an occupational licensing agency. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).
This subsection only applies to dealers that are registered in accordance with this section.
(1925, c. 190, s. 19; 1927, c. 149, s. 19; 1955, c. 436, s. 9; 1959, c. 1122; 1971, c. 831, s. 1; 1973, c. 1380; 1983, c. 713, s. 48; c. 817, ss. 9, 10; 1987, c. 566, s. 1; 1991 (Reg. Sess., 1992), c. 965, s. 2; 2002-126, s. 29A.34; 2003-413, s. 3; 2009-451, s. 24.1(a).)
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2009-451, s. 24.1(a), effective August 15, 2009, substituted "one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125.00)" for "seventy-five dollars ($75.00)" in the first sentence of subsection (b).
Opinions of Attorney General
Registration of Securities Dealers and Salesmen Constitutes Granting a License. - The registration of securities dealers and salesmen by the Securities Division pursuant to this section constitutes the granting of an "occupational license" within the meaning of G.S. 150B-2 (4a). See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).
(1925, c. 190, ss. 14, 15; 1927, c. 149, ss. 14, 15; 1973, c. 1380; 1997-419, s. 10.)
The Administrator may not institute a suspension or revocation proceeding on the basis of a fact or transaction known to him when registration became effective unless the proceeding is instituted within the next 120 days.
(1925, c. 190, s. 19; 1927, c. 149, s. 19; 1955, c. 436, s. 9; 1959, c. 1122; 1971, c. 831, s. 1; 1973, c. 1380; 1983, c. 817, ss. 11-15; 1997-456, s. 27; 1997-462, ss. 1, 2; 2001-126, s. 3.)
Editor's Note. - The latter portion of former subsection (a) was redesignated as subsection (a1) pursuant to Session Laws 1997-456, s. 27, which authorized the Revisor of Statutes to renumber or reletter sections and parts of sections having a number or letter designation that is incompatible with the General Assembly's computer database.
Opinions of Attorney General
The statutory standards embodied in this section, G.S. 78A-29(a) and G.S. 78C-28(b) are the public health, safety or welfare criteria which must be considered prior to and upon which a summary suspension must be founded. This section requires the summary suspension order to include the reasons for its entry. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).
Requirements of G.S. 150B-3(c) Do Not Conflict with This Section. - The requirements in G.S. 150B-3(c) that an agency make a finding that the "public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action" prior to a summary suspension of a license or an occupational license, and that the agency incorporate such finding in its order of suspension, are not in any way in conflict with the findings required to be made by the securities administrator by this section prior to denying, suspending, or revoking the registration of a securities dealer or salesman and by G.S. 78A-29(a) prior to denying, suspending, or revoking the effectiveness of a securities registration statement. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).
Article 3A of Chapter 150B Does Not Restrict or Modify This Section. - Even though the Securities Division is an "occupational licensing agency" within the meaning of G.S. 150B-2 (4b), the provisions of Article 3A of Chapter 150B , G.S. 150B-38 et seq., relating to the procedure for conduct of administrative hearings by occupational licensing agencies, in no way restrict or modify the provisions of subsections (a), (c), (e) and (f) of this section or G.S. 78A-45 or G.S. 78A-46(b) . See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).
(1981, c. 624, s. 5; 1983, c. 817, s. 16; 1987, c. 849, s. 3.)
§§ 78A-41 through 78A-44: Reserved for future codification purposes.
(1925, c. 190, ss. 20, 21; 1927, c. 149, ss. 20, 21; 1973, c. 1380; 1983, c. 817, s. 17; 2001-126, s. 9; 2020-74, s. 23(a).)
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2020-74, s. 23(a), effective July 1, 2020, added subsection (b1).
Opinions of Attorney General
Article 3A of Chapter 150B Does Not Restrict or Modify This Section. - Even though the Securities Division is an "occupational licensing agency" within the meaning of G.S. 150B-2 (4b), the provisions of Article 3A of Chapter 150B , G.S. 150B-38 et seq., relating to the procedure for conduct of administrative hearings by occupational licensing agencies, in no way restrict or modify the provisions of G.S. 78A-39(a) , (c), (e) and (f), this section or G.S. 78A-46(b) . See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).
(1925, c. 190, s. 16; 1927, c. 149, s. 16; 1973, c. 1380; 1977, c. 610, s. 2; 1987, c. 849, s. 4; 1991, c. 456, s. 2; 1997-462, s. 3.)
Opinions of Attorney General
Article 3A of Chapter 150B Does Not Restrict or Modify This Section. - Even though the Securities Division is determined to be an "occupational licensing agency" within the meaning of G.S. 150B-2 (4b), the provisions of Article 3A of Chapter 150B , G.S. 150B-38 et seq., relating to the procedure for conduct of administrative hearings by occupational licensing agencies, in no way restrict or modify the provisions of G.S. 78A-39(a) , (c), (e) and (f), G.S. 78A-45 or this section. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).
This section and G.S. 78C-27(b) are the equivalent of grand jury proceedings. So long as the exercise of these powers does not result in action on a registration without an opportunity to be heard under G.S. 78A-39 , it is not a function to which Chapter 150B has any application. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).
The clear proceeds of civil penalties imposed under this subsection shall be remitted to the Civil Penalty and Forfeiture Fund in accordance with G.S. 115C-457.2 . Any reimbursement imposed under this subsection shall be paid into the General Fund. No order under this subsection may be entered without prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing conducted pursuant to Article 3 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes.
(1925, c. 190, s. 16; 1927, c. 149, s. 16; 1973, c. 1380; 1983, c. 817, s. 18; 1991, c. 456, ss. 3, 4; 1997-462, s. 4; 1998-215, s. 120; 2001-126, s. 4.)
Legal Periodicals. - For article, "The Anti-Fraud Provisions of the North Carolina Securities Act," see 35 Campbell L. Rev. 209 (2013).
Cited in Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker, 38 N.C. App. 414, 248 S.E.2d 567 (1978).
(1925, c. 190, s. 18; 1927, c. 149, s. 18; 1973, c. 1380; 1977, c. 610, s. 3; 1983, c. 817, s. 19; 1987, c. 849, s. 5.)
(1925, c. 190, s. 11; 1927, c. 149, s. 11; 1973, c. 1380; 1987, c. 849, s. 6; 1997-419, s. 11; 2001-436, s. 10; 2003-413, s. 4; 2016-103, s. 3.)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2016-103, s. 4(a) and (b), provides: "4.(a) Notwithstanding any provision of Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes, within 12 months of the effective date of this act [Session Laws 2016-103 was effective July 22, 2016], the Secretary of State shall adopt rules to implement the provisions of this act in accordance with the following procedure:
"(1) At least 15 business days prior to adopting a rule, submit the rule and a notice of public hearing to the Codifier of Rules. The Codifier of Rules shall publish the proposed rule and the notice of public hearing on the Internet within five business days.
"(2) At least 15 business days prior to adopting a rule, notify persons on the mailing list maintained pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.2(d) and any other interested parties of the Secretary's intent to adopt a rule and of the public hearing.
"(3) Accept written comments on the proposed rule for at least 15 business days prior to adoption of the rule.
"(4) Hold at least one public hearing on the proposed rule no less than five days after the rule and notice have been published.
"A rule adopted in accordance with this section becomes effective on the first day of the month following the month the Secretary adopts the rule and submits the rule to the Codifier of Rules for entry into the North Carolina Administrative Code.
"(b) Any rule adopted more than 12 months after the effective date of this act [Session Laws 2016-103 was effective July 22, 2016] shall comply with the requirements of Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes."
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2016-103, s. 3, effective July 22, 2016, substituted "G.S. 78A-16 and G.S. 78A-17 (except G.S. 78A-17(9) , (17), (19), and (20))" for "G.S. 78A-16 or 78A-17 (except 78A-17(9), (17), and (19))" in subsection (d).
Cited in Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016).
(1925, c. 190, s. 17; 1927, c. 149, s. 17; 1955, c. 436, s. 8; 1973, c. 1380; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1148, s. 3; 1987, c. 566, s. 2; 1997-462, s. 5; 2020-74, s. 23(b).)
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2020-74, s. 23(b), effective July 1, 2020, added subsections (c4) through (c6).
§§ 78A-51 through 78A-55: Reserved for future codification purposes.
is liable to the person purchasing the security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with interest at the legal rate from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender of the security, or for damages if the purchaser no longer owns the security. Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less the value of the security when the purchaser disposed of it and interest at the legal rate as provided by G.S. 24-1 from the date of disposition.
No person may sue under this section for any other violation of this Chapter more than three years after the person discovers facts constituting the violation, but in any case no later than five years after the sale or contract of sale, except that if a person who may be liable under this section engages in any fraudulent or deceitful act that conceals the violation or induces the person to forgo or postpone commencing an action based upon the violation, the suit may be commenced not later than three years after the person discovers or should have discovered that the act was fraudulent or deceitful.
(1925, c. 190, s. 23; 1927, c. 149, s. 23; 1955, c. 436, s. 10; 1971, c. 572, s. 2; 1973, c. 1380; 1975, c. 19, s. 22; c. 144, s. 3; 1977, c. 781, s. 2; 1983, c. 817, ss. 20, 21; 1987, c. 282, s. 9; 1991, c. 456, s. 5; 2001-183, s. 1; 2001-436, s. 11; 2003-413, ss. 5-10.)
Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1974 case law on securities fraud, see 53 N.C.L. Rev. 1104 (1975).
For article discussing applicable statute of limitations in actions under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, see 7 Campbell L. Rev. 299 (1985).
For note, "Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co.: North Carolina's Caveat Tipper Exception to the In Pari Delicto Doctrine," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1250 (1986).
For article, "The Anti-Fraud Provisions of the North Carolina Securities Act," see 35 Campbell L. Rev. 209 (2013).
Punitive damages are not included in the relief available under this section. Hunt v. Miller, 908 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1990).
Applicability to Federal Claims. - The proper limitations period for G.S. 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 federal security claims is the two year limitations period under subsection (f) of this section. Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1993).
Construction. - Because this section parallels § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, cases construing § 12(2) should be considered when interpreting this section. Venturtech II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.C. 1992), aff'd, 993 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1993).
G.S. 1-22 Tolled Two-Year Limitations Period of Subsection (f). - Since this section is a statute of limitations and not a statute of repose in action seeking recession of purchase of securities, the two-year statute of limitations provided for in subsection (f) was tolled by operation of G.S. 1-22 because plaintiffs brought their claim within the one-year extension provided by that section. Walker v. Montclaire Hous. Partners, 736 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
Claims Not Barred by Statute of Limitations. - Investors' claims under the North Carolina Securities Act, G.S. 78A-1 to G.S. 78A-66 , were not barred by the Act's statute of limitations, G.S. 78A-56(f) , because the investors not only asserted claims under G.S. 78A-24 and G.S. 78A-36 , but also brought a claim for securities fraud under G.S. 78A-8 and G.S. 78A-56 , which were subject to the three-year limitations period, G.S. 78A-56(f) ; the jury's finding that the agent violated G.S. 78A-8 and G.S. 78A-56 , which were subject to the three-year statute of limitations, supported its verdict. Latta v. Rainey, 202 N.C. App. 587, 689 S.E.2d 898 (2010).
Claims Time-Barred. - Plaintiffs' G.S. 78A-56 claims were subject to a three-year limitations period, which began running at the time of discovery under G.S. 78A-56 (f); plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of a timeline to submit their claims to the jury. Orr v. Calvert, 212 N.C. App. 254, 713 S.E.2d 39 (2011), rev'd 365 N.C. 320 , 720 S.E.2d 387, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 989 (2011).
Investor's securities fraud claim against limited liability companies and the companies' managers were time-barred as to two investments because the investors did not file suit within three years of being put on inquiry notice as to allegedly false representations. Atkinson v. Lackey, - N.C. - , - S.E.2d - (Feb. 27, 2015).
Scienter. - In light of the North Carolina Securities Act's plain language, legislative history, and comparison to federal § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2), claims, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina holds that a G.S. 78A-56(a)(2) civil plaintiff need not prove scienter. Further, the Court of Appeals holds a materially false or misleading statement or omission made in connection with a security offer or sale is actionable even if the person making the statement or omission did not know it was false so long as the person was negligent under G.S. 78A-56(a)(2) in making the statement or omission. Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016), aff'd and modified in part, 372 N.C. 137 , 827 S.E.2d 479, 2019 N.C. LEXIS 379 (2019).
Integration Doctrine Applicable to Sale of Securities. - The integration doctrine, a method used to combine two or more otherwise exempt securities sales into a single offering, was applicable to a sale of securities where initial purchaser was offered securities through a special arrangement with his broker and was classified as the sole preliminary limited partner, and where the other North Carolina purchasers were 1985 limited partners admitted pursuant to an offering about a month later. Walker v. Montclaire Hous. Partners, 736 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
Initial Offering Violated G.S. 78-24 Registration Requirements and Subjected Sellers to Liability. - Where it was clear that offering of securities initially to one purchaser and to five other purchasers a month later were part of a single financing plan since the second offering was contemplated at the time of the initial offering and it was apparent that the offering memorandum would not be published until sellers were sure initial offering was purchased and the consideration for all the offerings was the same, the initial offering violated the registration requirements of G.S. 78A-24 and such violation precluded protection under G.S. 78A-17(9) and subjected the sellers to the civil liabilities provision of subdivision (a)(1), even though the proceeds of the initial offering were for use as seed money while the proceeds of the second offering were for use as general operating expenses, and the profit and losses between the two types of offerings were allocated differently and each had different tax deduction consequences. Walker v. Montclaire Hous. Partners, 736 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
"Control Persons". - Controlling shareholders, officers and directors were "control persons" within the meaning of this section. Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1987).
For purposes of G.S. 78A-56(a)(2)(c) , an arbitration panel's imposition of control person liability on two stock purchasers' claims against the president and two directors of a brokerage firm manifestly disregarded the law and facts; there was no evidence that the president or directors were involved in the allegedly unsuitable and unauthorized transactions in the stock purchasers' accounts with the brokerage firm or in the misrepresentations of fraud by a defrauding broker, and the task of supervising the operations of the brokerage firm was not in the hands of the president or the directors. Wallace v. Buttar, 239 F. Supp. 2d 388 (2003).
Summary judgment holding two managers of a limited liability company secondarily liable for securities fraud under G.S. 78A-56(c)(1) was inappropriate because there were material fact issues as to the managers' control of those allegedly making false representations and as to the managers' knowledge of such misrepresentations. Atkinson v. Lackey, - N.C. - , - S.E.2d - (Feb. 27, 2015).
A cause of action for aiding and abetting a securities violation is comprised of three elements. The plaintiff must prove (1) a primary violation by another person; (2) the aider and abettor's "knowledge" of the primary violation; and (3) substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in the achievement or consummation of the primary violation. Venturtech II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.C. 1992), aff'd, 993 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1993).
Plain language of G.S. 78A-56(a)(2) imposes liability on any person who is a seller or offeror, not just brokers and other securities professionals. Accordingly, a defendant may be liable as a seller or offeror under the North Carolina Securities Act, even though he did not act or solicit an investment as a securities professional or broker, and did not act with scienter. Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016), aff'd and modified in part, 372 N.C. 137 , 827 S.E.2d 479, 2019 N.C. LEXIS 379 (2019).
Aider and Abettor's Intent. - As to the second element in a cause of action for aiding and abetting a securities violation, absent a duty owed to the plaintiff by the alleged aider and abettor, the defendant aider and abettor must possess a high conscious intent and a conscious and specific motivation to aid the fraud. Venturtech II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.C. 1992), aff'd, 993 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1993).
Because investment firms failed to prove that public accounting firm possessed a "high conscious intent" to assist company in soliciting investors by untrue and misleading statements, and that public accounting firm substantially assisted such a violation, the investment firms could not establish a claim for aiding and abetting a violation of G.S. 78A-56 . Venturtech II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.C. 1992), aff'd, 993 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1993).
Cattle feeding program involving the buying, financings, caring for and sale of cattle for investors, which was open to any interested investors and advertised in national publications, was an investment contract which was not entitled to a private placement exemption and hence a security within the meaning of the applicable federal and state securities laws. Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1987).
Finance Company Held Liable. - Finance company, the sole purpose of which was to provide financing to investors in cattle program which was found to be an investment contract and hence a security within the meaning of the federal and North Carolina securities laws and which was never properly registered, was liable to plaintiff as a matter of law under this section as an aider and abettor. Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1987).
Valid Rescission Offer Shown. - Investment firm, which employed broker who engaged in fraudulent activity, nevertheless made a valid rescission offer under the terms of subdivision (g)(1) of this section and therefore plaintiff was precluded from maintaining action seeking damages for breach of contract, fraud and negligence. Mashburn v. First Investors Corp., 111 N.C. App. 398, 432 S.E.2d 869 (1993).
Invalidation of Indemnity Agreement Between Broker and Issuer. - If a jury should find that an issuer of securities knowingly participated in the illegal sales of securities by a broker, public policy would prohibit enforcement of the indemnity agreement between the broker and the issuer. Premier Corp. v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 578 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1978).
Investor's Involvement in Constructing Offer Made to Him Did Not Bar Recovery. - Fact that investor in limited partnership was somehow involved in the construction of the terms of the offer made to him did not bar recovery in suit for recession of securities, violation of regulation requirements and fraud. Walker v. Montclaire Hous. Partners, 736 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
Evidence of Liability Sufficient. - Evidence that broker discussed realty partnership and various securities of his security firm employer in the same conversation with one investor, that he was an employee and representative of the firm that whole time, that he operated out of firm's office in his dealings with the investors, received mail there concerning the realty partnership and in at least one case transferred money for the realty investment out of an investor's firm account, that the transfer was recorded on the firm's computer system but was never questioned by its managers, who were responsible for monitoring all transactions and who admitted that broker required more supervision than any other employee in the firm's office, was more than sufficient to sustain verdict finding firm liable as a controlling person of broker. Hunt v. Miller, 908 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1990).
No Error in Holding Firm Jointly and Severally Liable with Employee. - In action against securities firm and broker employee of firm for securities fraud, evidence was sufficient to establish that firm as controlling party and breached a duty owed investers by permitting employee to engage in fraudulent conduct that was within the scope of his apparent authority as an employee of the securities firm and of the same general nature as that authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized by the firm; therefore, it was not error to hold the firm jointly and severally liable with employee for attorneys' fees. Hunt v. Miller, 908 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1990).
Proofing Prima Facie Case. - When a plaintiff successfully proves a prima facie case under G.S. 78A-56(a)(2) , the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or omission. Therefore, if a plaintiff proves a prima facie case, a defendant will be liable unless he brings forward evidence to prove that his statement or omission was made with reasonable care as set out in G.S. 78A-56(a)(2) . Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016), aff'd and modified in part, 372 N.C. 137 , 827 S.E.2d 479, 2019 N.C. LEXIS 379 (2019).
Failure to Establish Active Misstatement of Any Material Facts - Grant of summary judgment to the employing corporation and its stockholder on the former employee's G.S. 78A-56(b) claim was proper as the employee, who sold his stock in the corporation to the stockholder upon the employee's leaving the corporation because he had signed an agreement stating that only employees could own stock, did not establish that the corporation or the stockholder actively misstated any material facts regarding the sale of the stock. Sullivan v. Mebane Packaging Group, Inc., 158 N.C. App. 19, 581 S.E.2d 452 (2003), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 511 , 588 S.E.2d 473 (2003).
Amendment to Complaint Held Prejudicial. - When plaintiff's new counsel filed motion to amend plaintiff's complaint to include a cause of action under subsection (a)(2) almost two years after the filing of the original complaint and approximately 9 months prior to trial, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion on the basis that it would be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. Freese v. Smith, 110 N.C. App. 28, 428 S.E.2d 841 (1993).
Failure to Give Instruction Regarding Controlling Firm's Culpable Participation Not Error. - In action by investors against securities firm and its employee for securities fraud, since it is only required of a controlling person that he maintain an adequate system of internal control in a diligent manner, jury instruction which contained this language was adequate to permit the jury to find that firm had failed to adequately supervise its employee; failure to give instruction regarding culpable participation was not error. Hunt v. Miller, 908 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1990).
Acknowledgments Held Void. - To extent that acknowledgments signed by stock purchasers could be seen as releases of securities claims, they were void under subsection (1) of this section. Signature of waiver stating that purchasers received all necessary information, when they may not have, constituted anticipatory waiver of duty to disclose, and purchasers could not have known of any misrepresentation or omission at time of signing. Jadoff v. Gleason, 140 F.R.D. 330 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
Jury Question. - Where it was shown that plaintiffs had reason to know of their securities claims based on the alleged fraud in the financial projections and real estate appraisal from the beginning of their investment due to the cautionary language in a confidential offering memorandum, remaining securities claims had to be resolved by a jury. Andrews v. Fitzgerald, 823 F. Supp. 356 (M.D.N.C. 1993).
Motion to Dismiss Claims as Barred by This Section Denied. - Since the dates for the sale or contract for sale of securities could not be determined from the face of the complaint, plaintiffs' claims were not barred on their face by the North Carolina Securities Act's two-year statute of limitations, and defendant's motion to dismiss the North Carolina Securities Act claims as barred by that statute was denied. Liner v. DiCresce, 905 F. Supp. 280 (M.D.N.C. 1994).
Statute of limitations defense failed where count related back to the original complaint which was filed well within the two-year period of subsection (f). Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 323 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
Summary Judgment Inappropriate. - When investors sued a limited liability company's managers and the company's managing limited liability company (LLC) for securities fraud, summary judgment was inappropriate as to claims under G.S. 78A-56(a)(2) because the managing LLC was an offeror of securities based on a manager's solicitation of investments, and fact issues existed as to alleged misrepresentations. Atkinson v. Lackey, - N.C. - , - S.E.2d - (Feb. 27, 2015).
Summary Judgment Appropriate. - Two managers of a limited liability company were not primarily liable for securities fraud under G.S. 78A-56(a)(2) because nothing showed the managers offered securities, as defined in G.S. 78A-2(8)(b) . Atkinson v. Lackey, - N.C. - , - S.E.2d - (Feb. 27, 2015).
Business court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of sellers and a real estate company on purchasers' secondary liability claims because the purchasers failed to offer proof that either the sellers or the company provided material aid with the requisite actual knowledge under the North Carolina Securities Act; the sellers and company had no duty to disclose anything directly to the purchasers, and there was no proof they knew of the alleged misrepresentations a bidder made. NNN Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Highwoods Realty Ltd., 261 N.C. App. 185, 820 S.E.2d 322 (2018), review denied, 373 N.C. 59 , 832 S.E.2d 719 (2019).
Deceptive Practices Claim Dismissed. - Investor's deceptive practices claims, alleging limited liability company managers committed constructive fraud when persuading the investors to invest in and become members of a limited liability company, failed because (1) G.S. 75-1.1 did not apply to securities fraud claims, (2) the constructive fraud claim failed as a matter of law, and (3) the gravamen of the constructive fraud claim was securities fraud. Atkinson v. Lackey, - N.C. - , - S.E.2d - (Feb. 27, 2015).
Motion for New Trial Based on Inconsistent Verdict Denied. - Director of a corporation who was held liable to investors in the corporation, for selling securities by means of false and misleading statements of material fact, was not entitled to a new trial because the verdict was not inconsistent as the evidence justified a finding that the statements of the corporation's chief executive officer, taken in context and as a whole, were not materially false and misleading, while the same could not be said for the director's statements. Piazza v. Kirkbride, 372 N.C. 137 , 827 S.E.2d 479 (2019).
Applied in Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 342 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Heath v. Craighill, Rendleman, Ingle & Blythe, 97 N.C. App. 236, 388 S.E.2d 178 (1990); Andrews v. Fitzgerald, 823 F. Supp. 356 (M.D.N.C. 1993).
Cited in Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985); McGarity v. Craighill, Rendleman, Ingle & Blythe, 83 N.C. App. 106, 349 S.E.2d 311 (1986); Weft, Inc. v. G.C. Inv. Assocs., 630 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D.N.C. 1986); Simms Inv. Co. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 688 F. Supp. 193 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 94 (M.D.N.C. 1993); Tierney v. Garrard, 124 N.C. App. 415, 477 S.E.2d 73 (1996), cert. granted, 345 N.C. 760 , 485 S.E.2d 309 (1997), aff'd, 347 N.C. 258 , 490 S.E.2d 237 (1997); Jay Group, Ltd. v. Glasgow, 139 N.C. App. 595, 534 S.E.2d 233 (2000), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 265 , 546 S.E.2d 100 (2000).
(1925, c. 190, s. 23; 1927, c. 149, s. 23; 1955, c. 436, s. 10; 1971, c. 572, s. 2; 1973, c. 47, s. 2; c. 1380; 1987, c. 849, s. 7; 1991, c. 456, s. 6; 2001-436, s. 12; 2003-413, s. 11.)
Legal Periodicals. - For article, "The Anti-Fraud Provisions of the North Carolina Securities Act," see 35 Campbell L. Rev. 209 (2013).
Corporate Officers and Agents May Be Held Criminally Liable Individually. - Any officers, directors, or agents of a corporation actively participating in a violation of the provisions of this section in the conduct of the company's business, or which such conduct they have actively directed, may be held criminally liable individually therefor. State v. Franks, 262 N.C. 94 , 136 S.E.2d 623 (1964).
Cited in State v. Clemmons, 111 N.C. App. 569, 433 S.E.2d 748 (1993).
A person is guilty of a Class H felony if the person willfully does any of the following for the purpose of interfering with the performance of any audit, examination, or investigation by the Administrator under this Chapter:
§§ 78A-59 through 78A-62: Reserved for future codification purposes.
(1927, c. 149, s. 24; 1955, c. 436, s. 10; 1973, c. 1380; 1975, c. 144, s. 4; 1997-181, s. 27; 1997-419, ss. 12, 13; 2001-436, s. 13; 2003-413, ss. 13-15.)
Legal Periodicals. - For article, "The Anti-Fraud Provisions of the North Carolina Securities Act," see 35 Campbell L. Rev. 209 (2013).
The scope of G.S. 78A-8 applies only to those persons who sell or offer to sell a security. State v. Williams, 98 N.C. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 746, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 144 , 394 S.E.2d 184 (1990).
Applied in Simms Inv. Co. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 688 F. Supp. 193 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
Cited in Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
This Chapter shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this Chapter with the related federal regulation.
Cited in Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1994).
Nothing in this Chapter affects the Viatical Settlements Act or the jurisdiction of the North Carolina Department of Insurance.